How Would 'Tempo Policies' Work? Exploring the Effect of School Reforms on Period Fertility in Europe by Lutz, W. & Skirbekk, V.
 
 
 
 
How Would “Tempo Policies” Work? 
Exploring the Effect of School Reforms on Period 
Fertility in Europe 
 
Wolfgang Lutz 
Vegard Skirbekk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wolfgang Lutz is Director of the Vienna Institute of Demography of the 
Austrian Academy of Sciences, and Leader of the World Population 
Program at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria. Vegard Skirbekk is a Research Scholar in the World 
Population Program at the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. 
 1
Abstract 
Governments and NGOs in many industrialized countries are 
concerned about the long-term demographic impacts of low fertility levels. 
We discuss how “tempo policies,” reforms that shift the timing of 
childbearing, affect period and possibly cohort fertility levels. One such 
policy is a school reform that decreases the educational completion age, 
which could be achieved through an earlier school entrance age and 
compression of the school duration. Such policies are currently in focus in 
several low fertility countries, although for reasons not related to family 
issues. We show that a younger initiation of childbearing would have a 
rejuvenating effect on the age composition and increase the size of the 
population. Even if just the timing and not the levels of fertility increase, a 
younger timing of fertility could soften the trends of shrinking and ageing 
populations. 
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INTRODUCTION1 
Governments and NGOs in many industrialized countries are 
concerned about the longer-term consequences of rapid population ageing on 
the pension systems, on the health system, as well as on intergenerational 
equity and global economic competitiveness. A recent prominent example is 
a study by the European Banking Federation in which the chief economists 
of over 4,500 commercial banks in Europe highlight the economic dangers 
of population ageing and state as the first of their three main 
recommendations: “Increasing the birth rate is particularly important...” 
(European Banking Federation 2004). 
In demographic terms, the future path of ageing is determined by 
four forces: The current age structure of the population as well as the future 
paths of fertility, mortality, and migration. Of these four forces only two, 
migration and fertility, are, at least theoretically, candidates for possible 
government policies intending to counteract the massive ageing trend. The 
current age structure is a given and as far as mortality is concerned, only 
policies aimed at increasing life expectancy and hence reinforcing ageing are 
politically feasible and ethically acceptable. 
Continued ageing is, to a large degree, pre-programmed in the 
current European age structure, where low birth rates over the past two 
decades have resulted in a small number of children and therefore decreasing 
numbers of potential mothers in the future. Because of this, Europe has 
already developed a negative momentum toward population shrinking (Lutz 
et al. 2003). Possible policies aimed at increasing fertility and/or increasing 
the volume of migration gain cannot be expected to reverse the ageing trend, 
but they could possibly weaken it and hence soften the expected negative 
consequences of ageing. Calculations based on the 15 member countries of 
the European Union (EU-15) in 2000 show that even in the case of a strong 
                                            
1 This paper was presented at the Population Association of America Annual 
Meeting, held in Boston, USA, April 1-3, 2004, in the session on “Fertility Policies” 
organized by Paul Demeny. 
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increase in immigration to 1.2 million net migration gain per year, the old 
age dependency ratio is likely to almost double by 2050. Similarly, even a 
strong hypothetical increase in fertility to 2.2 could not stop such significant 
ageing. Taken together, higher fertility and higher immigration can only 
moderate the ageing trend. In this context for the EU-15, it turns out that by 
2050, 100,000 additional immigrants per year have the same demographic 
effect as a sustainable increase in the total fertility rate (TFR) by 0.1 children 
per woman (Lutz and Scherbov 2003). 
In this paper, we focus on fertility-related policies and particularly 
on possible policies that are aimed at affecting the tempo of fertility, i.e., the 
effect that depresses the level of period fertility and hence lowers the number 
of births in a calendar year as long as the mean age of childbearing increases. 
In the next section we study the theoretical rationale for such tempo policies 
by discussing a) the possible demographic effects of a stop in the increase of 
the mean age of childbearing, and b) the political feasibility of such policies 
that would not aim at the number of children that couples choose to have 
(the quantum choice, which is largely seen as a private decision), but rather 
focus on the timing of these births. There are also important health reasons 
for trying to end a further increase in the mean age of childbearing, as well 
as social and economic welfare considerations. We will then look at the 
length of education as one of these social factors that is – for reasons other 
than fertility – currently the object of intensive policy considerations in 
many European countries. 
In short, the question is whether current plans to shorten the average 
school duration and shift the timing of education towards younger ages 
(while still achieving the same degrees) could result in a force exerting 
downward pressure on the mean age of childbearing that would be 
significant enough to stop or substantially weaken the current fertility 
depressing tempo effect. We look first at empirical Swedish data that clearly 
show that the exact age at high school graduation has a significant effect on 
the average age at first and second birth. We then present some hypothetical 
calculations for Austria, Italy and Sweden, where a younger school entrance 
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age and a shortening of education are currently being discussed, as well as 
for Bavaria, where it has recently been decided to shorten secondary school 
duration from nine to eight years. For both cases we find that such school 
reforms are likely to weaken the tempo effect and hence contribute to more 
births and slower ageing in the future. In the discussion section we consider 
other possible tempo policies that would not just shorten life cycle spans 
before childbirth, but possibly reorder the currently prevailing sequencing of 
events in adulthood by, e.g., encouraging student couples to have children. 
 
RATIONALE FOR TEMPO POLICIES 
This paper follows up on two recent papers and aims at concretising 
and operationalising the policy-relevant aspects of those papers. In March 
2003, Lutz, O’Neill and Scherbov published an article in Science entitled 
“Europe’s Population at a Turning Point.” One of the key points made in this 
paper was that the current fertility depressing effect of an ongoing increase 
in the mean age at childbearing will have a significant and lasting effect on 
population dynamics in Europe, presenting a force towards population 
decline and accelerated population ageing. This so-called tempo effect on 
fertility has recently received much attention in the demographic literature 
(see, e.g., Bongaarts and Feeney 1998; Kohler and Philipov 2001). It is 
based on the analytical insight that fertility is currently low in Europe for 
two different reasons: 1) Women are delaying births to later ages, resulting 
in fewer births in the calendar years during which this delay happens; 2) 
even after adjusting for this tempo effect, fertility is below replacement 
level. If women do not forego postponed births altogether, delayed 
childbearing does not affect the total number of births women have over the 
course of their lives, but still lowers period birth rates as long as 
postponement is going on and hence contributes to further population ageing 
and decline. In real life not all postponed births will be recuperated, and 
increases in the mean age of childbearing also tend to reduce the quantum of 
the fertility of the concerned cohorts (tempo-quantum interactions). 
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In the context of tempo analysis, much of the demographic work so 
far has focused on estimating fertility rates that adjust for this tempo effect, 
seeing it as a disturbance that should be eliminated in order to come up with 
a “purer” fertility measure, the tempo adjusted TFR. Lutz et al. (2003) turn 
this approach upside down and focus on the tempo effect not as something 
that should be ironed out, but rather as something that is the focus of interest 
and could provide a point of leverage for possible attempts to influence the 
level of period birth rates, something called tempo policies. Quantitatively 
they show that at the level of the 15 member states of the European Union 
(EU-15) in 2000, a hypothetical end to postponement would bring the period 
TFR up from currently 1.5 to 1.8 over the coming 10-40 years and would 
significantly moderate future population decline and ageing. They also show 
that about 45 percent of the calculated population decline in their scenarios 
is due to the tempo effect. In terms of ageing it is shown that a continuation 
of the tempo effect for the next 10-40 years would imply that an additional 
500 to 1.5 million person-years of workers would be needed to support the 
elderly population over the rest of the century, as compared with a no-delay 
scenario (hypothetical immediate end to the tempo effect). This clearly 
demonstrates that the changing age of childbearing represents a very 
important force of population dynamics in Europe that requires special 
attention. It is worth noting that tempo policies in the opposite direction, i.e., 
increasing the mean age at childbearing in order to speed up fertility decline 
in developing countries, has already been part of the demographic literature 
(see Bongaarts 1994). 
In another recent paper, Goldstein et al. (2003) explicitly address 
another more methodological point in this context. Stable population theory 
says that under below replacement fertility conditions, a longer mean age of 
generation implies a slower shrinking of the population. This is a force in the 
opposite direction as compared to the tempo effect described above. What is 
the balance of these two opposing effects? The authors show both through 
analytical considerations as well as through a set of alternative simulations 
that the tempo effect by far outweighs the mean length of the generation 
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effect for the coming centuries. The second effect would catch up only about 
250-300 years into the future, if it is assumed that all postponed births are 
later recuperated. If one also includes estimates of tempo-quantum 
interactions, then the tempo effect becomes so overwhelming that the mean 
length of the generation effect can safely be disregarded. In other words, the 
above-mentioned aspect of stable population theory does not put into 
question the assertion that in actual European populations, a near term end to 
postponement or even a decrease in the age of childbearing would have 
significant demographic consequences in the direction of less shrinking and 
less ageing. 
Although Lutz et al. (2003) are not very specific about how the 
suggested tempo policies could look, they discuss the political acceptability 
of policies following this line. Against the background that in contemporary 
Europe, explicitly pronatalistic policies meet pronounced public resistance, 
family policies in Europe today are based on an equal opportunity rationale 
and aim to help women combine childrearing with employment. With the 
possible exception of France, such policies in the past seem to have had 
little, if any, effect on period fertility (McDonald 2002; OECD 2003a), 
despite the very different family policies that countries apply when adjusting 
to the new economic and demographic realities (Gauthier 2002). Family 
policies aiming at the timing of births rather than family size may be more 
acceptable. Such policies would have an important health rationale in 
addition to a demographic rationale. A continued increase in the mean age of 
childbearing not only raises the risk of staying involuntarily childless, it also 
leads to burgeoning numbers of often cumbersome infertility treatments and 
increases the health risks associated with late pregnancies for both mothers 
and children. Hence, policies aimed at creating the conditions that allow 
women to have their children at an earlier age, or at least not being driven 
into further delays, could turn out to be win-win strategies, combining 
individual health concerns with public demographic concerns. 
What public policies could help to stop the further increase in the 
mean age of childbearing or even lead to a decrease within the foreseeable 
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future? There seem to be strong social and economic forces that work in the 
direction of ever increasing mean ages. The dominating view is that women 
want to finish their education first, then become established in a job and find 
a reliable long-term partner before they enter the demanding phase of raising 
children, which commits them for at least 15-20 years. And the standards of 
what is considered a satisfactory establishment in the professional career as 
well as what partnership is reliable enough to have children, seem to be 
continuing upward. How should such forces toward later childbearing 
possibly be reversed? 
In theory, there are two different ways in which childbearing could 
come earlier in the female life cycle: One is a reordering of sequences (such 
as having children prior to finishing education); another is maintaining the 
usual sequence but shortening the phases that precede the birth of children 
(such as compressing the period of education). While the first amounts to a 
major change in social institutions and the widespread thinking of what is 
the preferred sequence of events, the second seems more realistic in 
contemporary Europe. Actually, for reasons entirely unrelated to the timing 
of births, efforts in many European countries are underway, that aim at 
lowering the age at which young men and women finish their secondary or 
tertiary education without lowering the average educational attainment of 
these cohorts. 
In this paper we will focus on education reforms as a possible 
strategy to introduce a downward force on the mean age of childbearing. 
 
AGE AT GRADUATION AND THE TIMING OF DEMOGRAPHIC EVENTS 
Studies on the timing of events suggest that individuals tend to 
sequence events in adulthood according to rigid schemes: Leaving school 
precedes entering the labour market, having a child, and other events in 
adulthood (Billari et al. 2000; Blossfeld and De Rose 1992; Rindfuss et al. 
1980). An increase/decrease in the age at graduation, particularly at the 
tertiary level, is likely to raise/lower the age of entering parenthood, because 
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women usually postpone having children until they have completed their 
educational careers (Blossfeld and Huinink 1991). In effect, a change in the 
timing of one event is likely to affect the timing of subsequent events. 
This effective incompatibility between education and childbearing 
seems to have become stronger over time, at least in the U.S. (Rindfuss et al. 
1996). This implies that graduating from school is increasingly important for 
fertility decisions. Furthermore, even in countries where parental benefits 
aim at making it easier to combine having children with being a student, 
such as Norway, being enrolled in education still suppresses the probability 
of childbearing (Kravdal 2001), indicating that fertility choices during 
education are not strongly influenced by public policies. 
Over the past decades the increasing lengths of education have had 
substantial effects on fertility patterns. As educational attainment has 
increased during the last decades, the mean age at childbirth in most 
European countries has increased considerably, and total fertility rates have 
dropped below replacement levels (Council of Europe 2001). For example, 
in Sweden, the mean age at first birth increased from 26.3 (1990) to 27.9 
(2000), while TFR fell from 2.14 to 1.54. When discussing changes in the 
length of education and in the average age at graduation, it is important to 
distinguish between the changing age at which a certain level of education is 
completed and the change in the average level of educational attainment. 
Both factors have recently moved upwards. 
Educational reforms that decrease the age of leaving school are 
currently underway, or are being planned, in several European countries. 
School regulations can affect the graduation age by a) compressing or 
extending the school duration required for a specific educational degree, or 
b) changing the age of entering school, which for a given schooling period 
would alter the graduation age. 
Changes in the required school duration are currently underway 
across Europe, where, for example in Italy, tertiary education is now being 
shortened in order to adhere to the European standards given in the Bologna 
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Declaration 1999.2 At the secondary level, the German Bundesland Saarland 
shortened academic track school duration from nine years to eight years in 
2001, and several other Bundesländer, including Bavaria, are implementing 
similar policies. School shortening reforms are implemented in order to 
increase the flow of students through the system, to increase the supply of 
labour for the economy, and to improve the cost-effectiveness of the 
educational system. Possible fertility effects of these reforms on the level of 
period fertility have so far not been addressed. 
The age at entering school also varies, and can be as young as four 
or as old as eight years according to the country (UNESCO 2003). When 
German and Italian children enter school the year they turn six, their 
counterparts of the same age from Holland, England, Scotland, and Wales 
are already in their second year of school; in Luxemburg and Northern 
Ireland they are in their third year, while six year-olds in Denmark and 
Finland still have one year to go before they start to attend school. 
The school entrance age has in recent years been changed towards 
younger entrance ages in several countries. In Sweden the school entrance 
age was lowered in the 1990s, after regulations on the age of school entrance 
were liberalized. Only seven of the American states required enrolment in 
school below the age of seven in 1965, while in 1992, 25 states did so (U.S. 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare 1965; Education Commission 
of the States 1994). Moreover, a recent, industry-sponsored German 
proposal (Lenzen 2003) suggested lowering the school entrance age to four 
years and reducing the typical school duration to 10 years, in order to lower 
the age of exiting the educational system. 
Several other influences affect the duration between graduation and 
fertility decisions. These include the role of social norms for when to enter 
the labour market, the influence of the family in providing financial support 
to the children, as well as the degree of real wage flexibility, which affects 
                                            
2 Information available under 
http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/pdf/bologna_declaration.pdf 
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the likelihood of employment (Bentolila and Ichino 2000; Planas 1999; 
OECD 1999, 2000). However, the speed of the transition to adulthood, 
including unemployment spells and time spent out of the workforce, is not 
affected by whether the average school leaving age is low or high. 
International comparisons suggest that the transition from education to the 
labour force is not affected by the age of leaving school (OECD 2003b; 
UNESCO 2004). 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FERTILITY EFFECTS OF SCHOOL LEAVING 
AGE: THE CASE OF SWEDEN 
Women who attain higher education tend to have fewer children and 
have them at a later time, but the non-random educational sorting makes 
drawing conclusions about the causal nature of this relationship difficult. 
Women with older/younger age at leaving school tend to have different 
levels of education as well; therefore, they differ by unobserved 
characteristics that affect both educational attainment and fertility decisions, 
such as preferences, abilities, opportunities, and family background. To 
identify the causal effects of a change in the school leaving age, we present a 
study based on a natural experiment3 that produces variation in the 
explanatory variable (graduation age) that is uncorrelated with other 
influences on fertility. 
Skirbekk et al. (2004) analyse a dataset of 863,304 non-immigrant 
Swedish women born between 1946-1962 and utilize the fact that Swedish 
children are enrolled in school in the calendar year in which they become 
seven years old. Therefore, children who are born during two consecutive 
months, December and January, differ by 11 months in the age at graduating 
from school, although they are born merely one month apart. 
This institutional setting of the Swedish school system results in an 
exogenous variation in the age at completing compulsory or higher 
                                            
3 For a discussion of the use of natural experiments, see Rosenzweig and Wolpin 
(2000). 
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education, assuming that parents cannot time the births of their children very 
accurately to the exact month. Birth months affect age at graduation in the 
same way as a random sorting of individuals into higher and lower school 
leaving ages. This setting is, therefore, well suited to investigate the causal 
link between the timing of fertility and variation in the school leaving age. 
Skirbekk et al. find that variation in the school leaving age has a 
strong and consistent effect on the timing of demographic events in 
adulthood. An 11-month higher school leaving age, that is the difference 
between women born in December and January the following year, results in 
a 4.9 month later age at first birth. In Figure 1 this pattern is shown for the 
four quarters of the year, indicating a very clear downward slope and a 
difference of 3.1 months between the first and the fourth quarter within a 
year. 
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Figure 1  Age of mother at birth of first child for Swedish women born 
1946-1962. 
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The timing of the second birth is also affected by the school leaving 
age. The birth interval between the first and the second child remains 
virtually unchanged in response to variation in the age at first birth caused by 
different years of graduation. There is almost no difference in birth intervals 
between women born in the four quarters of the year, indicating that there is 
no conscious compensation for birth-month induced variation in the age at 
first birth. These findings suggest that important timing aspects of fertility 
are strongly connected to the time since leaving school, and that the 
childbearing age is strongly influenced by the fertility patterns of one’s 
former classmates. 
A school reform that lowers the school leaving age will in addition 
to affecting the individual’s biological age at the time of school exit also 
affect the social age of the social reference group (the class peers). The 
experiment conducted by Skirbekk et al. illuminates some fertility effects of 
a shock to the individual’s school leaving age, but not those stemming from 
a change in the social age of the school cohort. 
A lower age at graduation would increase the social age of those 
affected, which would increase the effect of a younger school leaving age on 
the timing as well as the quantum of childbearing through tempo-quantum 
interactions: The impact of a more “mature” social influence at a younger 
biological age would heighten the probability of having children at a 
younger age. This could in turn imply an increase in cohort fertility. A 
change in the school leaving age is likely to have a stronger influence on the 
timing of fertility than the one identified in the Swedish birth month 
experiment, since both biological and social age at the time of graduation 
matter for fertility decisions. Taken together, a not implausible assumption 
would be that a one-year change in the school graduation age would be 
reflected in a unit shift in the age of entering parenthood. But we will also 
experiment with other assumptions. 
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HYPOTHETICAL FORECASTS FOR AUSTRIA, BAVARIA, ITALY AND 
SWEDEN 
In order to investigate the possible demographic impacts of a change 
in the timing of fertility, we project the consequences of fertility changes for 
the young cohorts in Austria, Italy, Sweden, and the German state of 
Bavaria, which with 13 million inhabitants is bigger than many European 
countries.4 We assume zero net migration for all four regions. Life 
expectancy is assumed to increase by 1.5 years per decade; that means 11.25 
years for the 75-year duration, from 2000 to 2075. In Austria, life 
expectancy increases from 81.5 to 92.8 for women and 75.7 to 87 for men; in 
Bavaria from 79 to 90.3 for women and 73 to 84.3 for men; in Italy from 
81.6 to 92.9 for women and 75.8 to 87.1 for men; in Sweden from 82 to 93.3 
for women and 77.5 to 88.8 for men. 
In the following we will discuss five different scenarios that are 
based on different assumptions with respect to the future course of period 
TFR. In all cases where the effect of a school reform (resulting in an 
assumed lower mean age of childbearing) is being simulated, we assume that 
the reform first affects the female birth cohort of 1995. Hence, the effect on 
the period TFR will only be gradual and increase as more and more of the 
women born after 1995 move into the main reproductive ages. For the 
cohorts born before 1995, the rates are assumed to stay constant at the level 
described in the specific scenario assumptions. The assumed TFRs for the 
four populations are plotted in Figures 2a-2d. 
First, we consider a constant period TFR scenario (Scenario 1). It 
presents a reference case for comparison, in which all age-specific period 
fertility rates remain constant throughout the projection period. 
Substantively, this scenario assumes that current postponement continues. 
Since postponement cannot continue forever, it also implies that as the 
                                            
4 Sources of data: Statistics Austria, Bayerisches Landesamt für Statistik und 
Datenverarbeitung, ISTAT and Statistics Sweden. 
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tempo effect gets weaker, this will be compensated by a declining quantum 
in order to produce a constant period TFR. 
The next scenario refers to the hypothetical case of constant tempo-
adjusted period TFR (Scenario 2) at the current level. Here we assume that 
period fertility immediately jumps to the level of tempo-adjusted fertility, 
assuming an instant end to further delays in childbearing. These rates are 
then held constant over time. To estimate the adjusted tempo effect, we 
apply the Lutz et al. (2004) estimate for a general relationship between an 
increase in the mean age of childbearing and the tempo effect. It shows that 
on average in contemporary Europe, an increase in the mean ages of 
childbearing (over all birth orders) of 0.1 years depresses the period TFR 
levels by 0.19 children. Lutz et al. base this estimate on data from European 
countries from 1980-2000. Applying this estimate and taking into account 
the changes in the mean age of childbearing,5 the Austrian tempo-adjusted 
fertility is 1.69 and the unadjusted TFR in 2002 is 1.41. In Bavaria, the 
tempo-adjusted fertility is 1.62 and the unadjusted TFR in 2002 is 1.36. In 
Italy, the tempo-adjusted fertility is 1.51 and the unadjusted TFR in 2000 is 
1.24. In Sweden, the tempo-adjusted fertility is 2.08 and the unadjusted in 
2002 is 1.70. 
Next we consider a scenario reflecting a specific school reform 
(Scenario 3). In this scenario we consider the case of a school reform that 
has the net effect of reducing the mean age of childbearing by two years for 
the cohorts born 1995 or later. This is implemented by a simple downward 
shift in the age-specific fertility profile for the cohorts concerned. This effect 
                                            
5 The Austrian annual rise in the mean age of childbearing is estimated to be 0.15 
years, which is calculated as the average annual change from 1997 to 2000. The 
Bavarian annual rise in the mean age of childbearing is 0.138 years, which is 
calculated as the average annual change from 2001 to 2002. The Italian annual rise 
in the mean age of childbearing is 0.142 years, which is calculated as the average 
annual change from 1991 to 2000. The Swedish annual rise in the mean age of 
childbearing is 0.165 years, which is calculated as the average annual change from 
2000 to 2003. 
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is clearly stronger than what one would expect from a shortening of the 
educational period by one year. It might be seen as close to representing the 
case in which the average school leaving age drops by two years because of 
a school reform, which might be the result of a lower school entrance age, or 
a compressed education, or a combination of both. Since we do not have 
sufficient evidence for assuming a certain quantitative relationship between a 
lower age of leaving school and a lower mean age of childbearing (see 
discussion above), we found it safer to make the assumptions in terms of a 
certain assumed shift in the age pattern of fertility. The effect of a one-year 
decline in the mean age of childbearing would be half of the effect calculated 
under this scenario. 
The next scenario studies the case of a school reform with quantum 
effect (Scenario 4). Here the likely possibility of a tempo-quantum 
interaction on fertility is investigated, where the cohorts affected by the 
school reform are not only younger at the time of childbearing, but also 
increase fertility outcome levels.6 We base our estimates on Kohler et al. 
(2001), who find that a one-year earlier initiation of childbearing increases 
cohort fertility by three percent. Given the school reform that causes a two-
year drop in the age at first birth, this would lead to a six percent higher 
fertility in the “reform with quantum effect” scenario. 
Finally, we consider a fifth scenario, which looks at the case of a 
school reform with quantum effect on top of Scenario 2 (Scenario 5). Here 
we simply assume that the reform does not affect a society that is otherwise 
continuing the delay of childbearing (as assumed in Scenario 1), but we look 
at the hypothetical case that postponement would come to a natural end 
(Scenario 2) and the effect of the school reform, including the effect of 
                                            
6 This result may be compatible with the results from Skirbekk et al. (2004) who 
find no impact on fertility outcome of a lower/higher biological age when leaving 
school. This is due to the fact that a decrease in the school leaving age would also 
increase the individual’s social age, which could lead to higher cohort fertility 
levels. 
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possible associated tempo quantum interactions, would come on top of this. 
Clearly, this scenario has the highest assumed future fertility rates. Table 1 
presents a summary of the five scenarios. 
Figures 2a-d show the trends of period TFR that underlie the five 
scenarios. In order to allow the study of long-term implications of these 
assumptions, the time horizon goes until 2075. Figure 2a gives the period 
fertility levels for Austria, 2b for Bavaria, 2c for Italy, and 2d for Sweden. 
Figures 3a-d give the results in terms of the series of absolute 
numbers of births. The overall trend is clearly declining for all scenarios in 
Austria, Bavaria and Italy. This is because fertility, even under the highest 
scenarios, will still be below replacement level and because smaller cohorts 
of women will enter the reproductive ages as a consequence of the low 
fertility in the past (the negative momentum of population growth). In 
Sweden (see Figure 3d) where the TFR is currently around 1.7 and the age 
distribution is even younger, the calculated scenarios partly result in an 
increase in the absolute number of births and the size of the population. 
Austrian period fertility (Figure 3a) is similar and currently around 1.41. 
Figures 4a-d show the old age dependency ratio for the four 
populations and the different scenarios. Since this ratio is defined as the 
population above age 65 divided by the population aged 15-64, one would 
only expect a delayed effect of changes in the births series. And indeed the 
four Figures (4a-d) show a visible variation among scenarios beginning only 
around 2030. After that the differences turn out to be quite sizable. In 
Bavaria and Italy, the lowest fertility scenarios (Scenarios 1 and 3) result in 
old age dependency ratios that increase to above 0.7 and 0.9 by 2075, 
whereas in the cases of a declining mean age of childbearing, presumably as 
a consequence of school reform combined with a natural end of the tempo 
effect, these ratios would increase to 0.5 and 0.7. 
Figures 5a-d give the implications for changes in total population 
size due to these fertility changes under otherwise identical mortality and 
migration assumptions. For Austria, Bavaria and Italy, none of the scenarios 
can stop the significant population decline that is implied by the declining 
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number of births as described above. But the extent of decline is still 
surprising, even when one considers that this is for a closed population 
(assuming no migration) and constant mortality. Under all scenarios but one, 
the population of Bavaria would decline from currently around 12 million by 
at least a third by 2075. Only the combination of a significant school reform 
with a natural end to the tempo effect will result in 8.5 million. For Italy, the 
picture is even a bit more extreme. But the point of this exercise is not to 
look at absolute changes (for this we need realistic migration assumptions), 
but rather to compare the scenarios and study the relative impacts of possible 
school reform effects. In Sweden, the situation is less drastic, and two of the 
scenarios (S 2 and S 5) predict an increase in the size of the population until 
2075. Table 2 presents the results of the five scenarios for Austria, Bavaria, 
Italy and Sweden in numerical form. 
In summary, the tentative scenarios presented in this section clearly 
indicate that changes in the age of childbearing (here operationalised as a 
two-year change) that can be the result of school reforms have significant 
long-term effects on population dynamics. If we compare the constant period 
TFR scenario (scenario 1) with the school reform with quantum effect 
scenarios (scenario 4), then we see that the absolute number of births over 
the coming decades is likely to be 8-16 percent higher in the case of school 
reform. In terms of total population size and the old age dependency ratio, 
the long-term differences due to an assumed education reform (even without 
a natural end to the tempo effect) are at the order of 5 to 10 percent. 
Considering what a single percentage point means in terms of expenses for 
social security, these are indeed very significant long-term impacts that make 
a closer analysis of the effects of school reform on the mean age of 
childbearing a worthwhile effort. 
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Table 1  Scenario description. 
 
Scenario  Tempo
adjustment 
Educational reform – 2 years younger school leaving age Fertility 
outcome level 
S 1 No No Constant 
S 2 Yes No Constant 
S 3 No Yes, childbearing shifts 2 years toward younger ages Constant 
S 4 No Yes, childbearing shifts 2 years toward younger ages Increases by 6% 
S 5 Yes Yes, childbearing shifts 2 years toward younger ages Increases by 6% 
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Figure 2  Total fertility rate under the five alternative scenarios. 
 20
a) Austria
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Figure 3  Number of births (in thousands) under the five alternative scenarios. 
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Figure 4  Old age dependency ratio (65/15-64 year olds) under the five alternative scenarios. 
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Figure 5  Population size (in millions) under the five alternative scenarios. 
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Table 2  Results of the five scenarios for Bavaria, Italy, and Sweden in 
numerical form. 
 Scenario 2005 2025 2050 2075 
Total fertility rate     
Austria S 1 1.41 1.41 1.41 1.41 
 S 2 1.69 1.69 1.69 1.69 
 S 3 1.41 1.46 1.41 1.41 
 S 4 1.41 1.54 1.49 1.49 
 S 5 1.69 1.83 1.78 1.78 
Bavaria S 1 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36 
 S 2 1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62 
 S 3 1.36 1.55 1.36 1.36 
 S 4 1.36 1.60 1.44 1.44 
 S 5 1.36 1.88 1.71 1.71 
Italy S 1 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 
 S 2 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.51 
 S 3 1.24 1.32 1.24 1.24 
 S 4 1.24 1.39 1.32 1.32 
 S 5 1.51 1.65 1.60 1.60 
Sweden S 1 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70 
 S 2 2.08 2.08 2.08 2.08 
 S 3 1.70 1.96 1.70 1.70 
 S 4 1.70 2.03 1.80 1.80 
 S 5 1.70 2.04 2.18 2.18 
Births      
Austria S 1 67,357 51,067 34,761 23,438 
 S 2 80,978 68,645 55,224 44,369 
 S 3 67,357 52,012 35,015 23,052 
 S 4 67,357 54,773 39,030 27,259 
 S 5 80,978 74,139 62,808 52,453 
Bavaria S 1 105,283 85,088 56,496 38,195 
 S 2 119,303 99,924 77,811 60,610 
 S 3 105,283 94,232 60,039 38,667 
 S 4 105,283 97,366 64,513 43,497 
 S 5 119,303 112,575 87,652 68,939 
Italy S 1 424,924 299,348 179,841 109,348 
 S 2 517,338 397,738 283,185 206,216 
 S 3 424,924 309,699 183,526 107,902 
 S 4 424,924 324,453 202,305 125,561 
 S 5 517,338 439,570 328,850 246,516 
Sweden S 1 96,657 89,359 71,589 57,472 
 S 2 118,299 110,319 107,581 103,722 
 S 3 96,657 101,459 76,835 59,578 
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 S 4 96,657 104,235 82,766 67,600 
 S 5 118,299 120,816 118,073 117,230 
Old age dependency ratio    
Austria S 1 0.24 0.26 0.59 0.60 
 S 2 0.23 0.25 0.51 0.50 
 S 3 0.23 0.25 0.58 0.58 
 S 4 0.23 0.25 0.57 0.57 
 S 5 0.23 0.25 0.49 0.47 
Bavaria S 1 0.24 0.32 0.49 0.71 
 S 2 0.24 0.32 0.45 0.58 
 S 3 0.24 0.32 0.48 0.68 
 S 4 0.24 0.33 0.48 0.65 
 S 5 0.24 0.32 0.43 0.54 
Italy S 1 0.28 0.38 0.73 0.93 
 S 2 0.28 0.37 0.63 0.72 
 S 3 0.28 0.38 0.72 0.89 
 S 4 0.28 0.38 0.71 0.85 
 S 5 0.28 0.37 0.61 0.65 
Sweden S 1 0.27 0.40 0.53 0.71 
 S 2 0.27 0.39 0.46 0.55 
 S 3 0.27 0.40 0.51 0.67 
 S 4 0.27 0.40 0.51 0.64 
 S 5 0.27 0.39 0.45 0.51 
Population      
Austria S 1 7,931,326 7,493,667 5,933,742 4,103,660 
 S 2 7,983,362 7,801,698 6,745,046 5,396,296 
 S 3 7,910,378 7,540,904 6,050,289 4,219,802 
 S 4 7,910,378 7,561,625 6,153,934 4,424,651 
 S 5 7,983,362 7,938,598 7,061,539 5,902,589 
Bavaria S 1 12,036,100 10,947,896 8,423,244 6,609,296 
 S 2 12,094,979 11,348,709 9,334,737 7,962,561 
 S 3 12,036,100 11,056,722 8,573,865 6,759,221 
 S 4 12,023,897 11,058,541 8,640,079 6,914,506 
 S 5 12,096,228 11,498,655 9,663,439 8,463,988 
Italy S 1 56,424,447 49,215,330 37,722,539 25,857,855 
 S 2 56,955,415 51,399,766 42,489,430 32,981,525 
 S 3 56,424,447 49,670,702 38,285,858 26,360,381 
 S 4 56,424,447 49,758,931 38,774,180 27,292,523 
 S 5 56,954,750 52,130,121 44,105,431 35,471,643 
Sweden S 1 8,955,054 8,775,288 7,674,566 6,461,016 
 S 2 9,020,697 9,250,914 8,902,594 8,643,211 
 S 3 8,955,054 8,861,661 7,855,478 6,703,930 
 S 4 8,955,054 8,875,818 7,983,362 7,011,216 
 S 5 9,020,697 9,313,141 9,171,672 9,231,095 
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DISCUSSION 
Tempo policies are a new concept, and possibly a powerful and 
socially acceptable way to increase period fertility rates where they are 
considered to be too low. As discussed in Lutz et al. (2003) and Goldstein et 
al. (2003), this concept is based on a sound demographic rationale, but is far 
from mature in terms of its possible social operationalisation. In this paper 
we tried to focus on education reforms that lead to a younger mean age at 
graduation for a given degree as one possible form of tempo policy. Such 
reforms are currently being discussed in order to improve the supply of 
skilled young labour and to reduce the social cost of education (which in 
itself would be a win-win strategy). If these reforms would help to stop the 
trend toward ever increasing mean ages of childbearing, which is desirable 
for both individual health and aggregate demographic reasons, this would 
actually represent a multiple win strategy. But clearly more work is needed 
to substantiate this claim. The purpose of this paper is to propose the 
approach and initiate a discussion that hopefully will result in many more 
contributions. 
Low period fertility is not only of concern in Europe. Several Asian 
countries have TFRs of below 1.5 and are confronted with the prospect of 
significant population ageing as a consequence. The concern about low 
fertility has been particularly pronounced in Singapore. Over the last years 
the government of Singapore has implemented several policy packages, 
including tax cuts, housing support and cash benefits, that are explicitly 
pronatalist in a way that would make them not easily acceptable in Western 
Europe. With current (2002) TFR at 1.37, that of the Chinese population 
majority at 1.18, and that of women with tertiary education below 0.8, 
fertility differentials are also a major concern. Unfortunately we do not have 
the data to assess the extent to which this very low fertility is due to a tempo 
effect. But there is evidence that fertility postponement is very strong among 
the more highly educated women in Singapore and therefore, we expect a 
strong tempo effect. Because past pronatalist policy packages did not result 
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in fertility increases and period fertility continued to fall, the prime minister 
of Singapore set up a special task force under his supervision to deal with the 
issue of low fertility. With the high political priority assigned to the issue 
and a past record of rather strong government influence on private lifestyle, 
Singapore may be a candidate for trying to implement policies that not only 
shorten the periods of education to a given degree, but actually try to reverse 
the life cycle sequence of parts of the younger cohorts. In Singapore 
childbearing is (still) universally within wedlock and marriage is typically 
postponed until the couple can afford an apartment, which means that they 
must have made some money in the labour market first. In this context 
providing student couples who are ready to marry and have children with 
subsidized campus housing and childcare to actually be able to meet their 
child desires may well result in an increase in student fertility. One would 
expect that during study time, young parents may have more flexibility for 
arranging their days and accommodating childcare than in the case of both 
partners trying to fight their way up in competitive companies. 
The reordering of the currently rather rigid life cycle sequencing 
could, of course, also be considered for the rest of the low fertility world. 
One may think of a lot of reasons for such reordering: Doctors tell us that 
from a purely physiological perspective the best age of childbearing is 20-
25. So much on the health rationale. What about the stability of partnership 
and divorce as factors in this rationale? It is often argued that a lower age at 
marriage means a higher risk for divorce and hence is potentially harmful to 
the children. While it is true that marriages below age 20 show a higher risk 
of divorce, this is less clear for marriages in the low and mid-20s (Lutz et al. 
1991). In any case, with increasing rates of non-marital unions and non-
marital fertility, this issue becomes less relevant. Also, the divorce rates 
which are well above 50 percent in many European cities seem to be driven 
by many other factors for which it is not necessarily advantageous to have 
children late in life. If a couple has children early on, they will be grown up 
earlier, giving their parents more independence. Men will be less affected 
when they come into their infamous mid-life crisis and decide to abandon 
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their first family. For women, if at age 30 the children are already beyond 
infancy, they may still invest more into their working career as opposed to 
this happening at age 40. Of course, there are many pluses and minuses to be 
considered in both directions, but at least we want to start an interesting 
discussion about the timing of fertility that has implications beyond the 
individual life cycle. 
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